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ESSAYS AND BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT.
By Wallace Mendelson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
1961. Pp. 151. $4.00.
This book is another contribution to the recently burgeoning litera-
ture on the judicial process. ' It is evident that the dilemmas of judicial
review which were so much discussed in the early 1930's are fashionable
puzzles once again.
Professor Mendelson has entered the debate from an attractive
angle. Selecting justices Black and Frankfurter as representing polar
opposites in the judicial role, he has proceeded to trace the judicial profile
of each through a formidable number of cases.
At the outset it would appear that he is neutral as between his two
contending champions and is merely delighted with the opportunities for
analysis the conflict between them has created. The rift in the current
Court, he states, "wears a jewel in its head. Never before on the bench
has the role of the Court in our federal democracy been canvassed with
such outspoken intellectual vigor. Here perhaps posterity will find unique
greatness in the 'new' Supreme Court."2 However, before many pages
are read, it is quite apparent that Professor Mendelson does not intend
to merely anatomize two different views of the judicial role; his interest
is normative and he has a clear perference. The preference is for Justice
Frankfurter's definition of the role and the book is in effect an able,
reasoned defense of the Frankfurter position.
As would be expected, the detailed comparison of Justices Black and
Frankfurter proves to be rich, complex and intellectually strenuous fare.
Professor Mendelson writes fluently and with enthusiasm and economy,
and the essay almost comes off as a tour de force in constitutional law
criticism.
That it does not come off completely is due, I think to certain
difficulties in Professor Mendelson's method and approach; that it comes
1. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN (1960) ; HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958) ; BLAcK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Wechsler, Toward Ncutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959) ; Hart, Foreword: The
Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959) ;
Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298 (1960); Shapiro, Judicial
Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Position, 47 CORN. L.Q. 175 (1962).
2. Page 8.
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off as well as it does is due to the strength and deep fascination of,
Justice Frankfurter. We shall consider these points in turn.
A first difficulty is that the author was not content with the large
task set for himself but wished also to write a general essay on con-
stitutional law. Such endeavors are simply too great a burden for so
small a book to carry. The author has organized the essay into three
major segments: issues of federalism, of separation of powers and of
democracy or individual liberty. Although this organizational pattern
permits some interesting generalizations about these topics, I found that
it hampered the job of closely comparing the work of the two justices.
I would have been helped had the author organized along lines more
functionally related to the judicial role such as judicial review of federal
legislation, judicial review of state legislation, construction of statutes,
judicial review of administrative agencies, the handling of petitions for
certiorari, etc.
A second difficulty is more fundamental. It was a mistake to have
included Justice Black as a foil for Justice Frankfurter. I doubt if they
exemplify different conceptions of the judicial role. The difference be-
tween them stems more from substantive disagreements.' If Justice
Frankfurter read the Constitution as Justice Black does, his special view
of the role of a Supreme -Court Justice would not necessarily keep him
from deciding the way Black does. And in any event, Justice Black
has not, like Justice Frankfurter, discussed explicitly from the bench his
view of judging. Hence, the comparison is not between two articulate
views of the role of the judge but between the articulated view of the
one and a series of decisions by the other.
Perhaps because of this, Professor Mendelson constantly gives the
appearance of seeking to diminish Justice Black in order to enhance
Justice Frankfurter. Very probably no one could have succeeded in com-
paring these two judges to the complete satisfaction of enthusiasts in both
camps, but Professor Mendelson is so much less empathetic to the Black
position than he is to the Frankfurter position that we keep feeling he
has loaded the dice. He speaks warmly of Justice Black as a man-he is
seen as generous, courageous, idealistic, democratic and principled; but
on Professor Mendelson's view, he is not really a judge, but rather a
layman amateur who on the bench is doctrinnaire, simplistic, irresponsi-
ble, inconsistent and given to making decisions ad hoc under the dictates
3. Arguably the crucial difference lies in the preferred position controversy. It
would be a useful exercise to remove this area of disagreement and see how vital a
difference remains. See Shapiro, J]tdicial Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred-
Position, 47 CORN. L.Q. 175 (1962).
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of spontaneous personal preference. We are constantly told what Justice
Frankfurter said but only how Justice Black decided; when they happen
to agree, it is Justice Frankfurter who has thought the problem through
and Justice Black who has taken a short cut; when Justice Stone, who
seems universally regarded as a sound man, agrees with Justice Frank-
furter, the author dutifully notes the fact; when Justice Stone agrees
with Justice Black, the fact is often overlooked. In any event, the
position of Justice Frankfurter is sufficiently complex and sufficiently
powerful in its own right to stand alone. By choosing to set Frankfurter
off against Black the author has enormously complicated his task of
analysis and, worse, has invited the charge of partisanship.
The effort to make a comparative study has aggravated certain
problems of method. If one is not to examine and discuss all of the
decisions of the two justices, how can he safely sample them? Professor
Mendelson does not confine himself to cases in which each has written
an opinion in opposition to the other; several times the opposition is
traced through decisions alone. Thus he makes a strong point about the
difference in technique found in Vermilya-Brawn v. Co uell,' which
posed the question of whether the Fair Labor Standards Act could be
read as applying to a United States army base in Bermuda. To be sure,
the case is a good one for the author's purposes, but unless one reads
very carefully he will not note that what we are comparing is a majority
opinion of Justice Reed in which Justice Black merely concurred with
a dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson in which Justice Frankfurter
merely concurred.
There is tension here on any approach. The problems of judicial
role are not found solely in the cases of constitutional challenge but are
reflected in all of the phases of the Court's complex agenda. Hence, it is
attractive to consider a large number of cases. But as the number of
cases increases there are two sharp difficulties. First, the reader will
always have still another case which he feels should have been put under
scrutiny ;5 and second the treatment of so many cases-Professor Mendel-
son must cover well over one hundred-in so short a space, although he
does it most ably, is in the end almost indigestible.
My own preference, to put in a plug for the home team, would be
for the technique of our Supreme Court Review which limits its articles
to a detailed discussion of a single problem. Perhaps only in so confined
4. 335 U.S. 377 (1948) ; discussed by Professor Mendelson at pages 18-19.
5. Thus, this reader would have liked something on the congressional committee,
the obscenity and the bar admission cases. The omissions are not all in one direction,
however; for example, the courageous Frankfurter dissent filed after the execution in
Rosenberg v. Denno, 346 U.S. 271 (1953) is not noted.
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a compass is the full exploration of differing judicial roles a safe enter-
prise. And while I am so full of suggestions for the design of a book
Professor Mendelson did not want or try to write, I might as well go
the whole way and suggest that I would have found more rewarding a
full scale examination of a single case-the second flag salute case which
exacted the fullest statement from Justice Frankfurter of his stance.6
But the important point is that despite these difficulties Professor
Mendelson has written an interesting and useful book, and that he has
done so, to repeat, because he reminds us systematically of how extra-
ordinarily rich the profile of Justice Frankfurter is.
At every level of the Court's business from judicial review of con-
stitutionality to the administration of petitions for certiorari, Justice
Frankfurter's touch has a distinctive emphasis. The roster is as impres-
sive as it is familiar-extreme self-restraint in exercising the power to
declare legislation unconstitutional, repudiation of any preferred posi-
tion doctrine, insistence on precedent and stability, insistence on not de-
ciding more than is absolutely necessary, insistence that the Court con-
fine itself to significant cases, deference to competence in other areas,
an acute allergy to absolutes in any form, an insistence that there is no
short cut for judicial decision, a deep respect for procedural due process,
a recognition that the states are areas of social experiment, etc., etc. Each
of these facets is deserving of discussion and Professor Mendelson's
book has helped illuminate them.
With so large a theme and with the space, time, and competence
available to me, I can at most touch on a few points. Justice Frankfurter
seems to me a singularly interesting judge-perhaps the most interesting
of all judges-because he is cursed with a sophisticated realist insight
into the judicial process, and unlike Holmes, Cardozo, Hand or Jerome
Frank, he has chosen to struggle explicitly with this insight while on the
bench. The insight is the realization of how much power a judge really
has-that he often must in some sense legislate whichever way he decides.
Justice Frankfurter has further complicated his life as a Supreme Court
Justice by adopting the view that the Constitution is in some way a grow-
ing organic document taking on new meanings for new times. What is
arresting here is not the insight about judicial power or the Constitution,
but the moral struggle it has imposed on Justice Frankfurter. His quest
as a judge is for some objective criteria which in so free an enterprise
as judging will keep him from simply translating personal preference
into law. If legislate he must, then legislate he will; but only if he can
6. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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find a way to exercise that power decently, responsibly and objectively.
One might well say that Felix Frankfurter is the first fully self-aware
judge we have had the privilege of watching at work. One might also
say that he is almost in the position of knowing too much about the
judicial process to function as a judge. In brief, he is Hamlet on the
bench.
The quest is, therefore, dramatic, courageous, valuable and fascinat-
ing, and we are all in his debt for the stoic persistence with which he
has pursued it.
It is clear that certain of his critics are very wide of the mark.
justice Frankfurter is particularly a judge whose personal values cannot
be read back from his decisions; there is always the high likelihood
that he has been guided by some intermediate values about the judicial
function which he deemed in the long run more important. Hence, it is
meaningless to talk of him as a conservative; it is meaningless, it is un-
fair and it misses the whole point.
Again, there is a complex integrity and consistency in his approach.
This is well illustrated by his opinion in the well-known Wilkerson case
involving the review of a state court judgment under the Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act. He is explicit that he thinks such cases are not the
proper business of the Supreme Court, that the FELA is an outmoded
law in its insistence on negligence in the handling of industrial accidents
and that the court should go cautiously in reversing the judgments of
state courts on such issues; but then he adds that if the issue must be
decided he thinks there was enough evidence of negligence to go to the
jury and he joins the majority in reversing the state court.
It is the great virtue of Professor Mendelson's book, whatever we
may feel about his treatment of Justice Black, that he has done an
admirable job on Justice Frankfurter and has made us see with special
clarity the difficult task the Justice has set for himself. One cannot
down, however, certain problems this definition of the judicial function
raises and on these Professor Mendelson has been less helpful. First,
there is the question of whether the intermediate values to which Justice
Frankfurter accedes are, even in the long run, that valuable. In part
this is the classic conundrum of law versus equity in a new form and we
are not likely to reach an easy resolution of it. In part this takes us to
a second question, the model of democracy which underlies the Frank-
furterian values. It is, as we get glimpses of it in the opinions, disturb-
ingly simple. Whatever the realism with which Justice Frankfurter has
7. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
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viewed the judicial process, we do not seem to find the same touch when
he turns to the political process.8 Any interference with the popular will
as reflected in majority vote-at least if done by non-elective officials
like judges-is taken as axiomatically wrong, anti-democratic and debili-
tating to the popular sense of responsibility. At this point, the questions
come up fast. Might not the Court as a growing institution have achieved
a politically meaningful role in the total political process today? If expres-
sion of the popular will is so critical, does not this lead to the Black
insistence on keeping the political process free and open at all costs?
And again does the Frankfurterian judicial review make any sense as a
political institution-why should any one have preferred the setting up
of this anemic check to the simplicity of not having judicial review at all?
And how seriously are we to take the threat of debilitating the popular
sense of responsibility said to reside in preventing the majority from
learning from its own mistakes?
These are all, to be sure, familiar issues. For the moment, under
the stimulus of Professor Mendelson's essay, I am intrigued by three
other points. First, is the Frankfurterian quest humanly feasible? Once
the judge realizes he is free, can he find sufficient objective reeds on
which to lean in controlling that freedom? The brilliance with which
Justice Frankfurter has discovered such reeds is perhaps the most fasci-
nating technical aspect of his judging and would be the most rewarding
topic for close study. And in any event the point may well be that here
even the impossible quest is worthwhile. Second, there is the question of
whether the definition of the judicial role does not itself tend to become
an absolute and a source of rigidity? The answer may well be that this
is simply the rigidity of neutrality and the rule of law, and that to temper
this austere conception of the judicial role with equity in the particular
case has all the difficulties captured in the old joke about the girl who
was a little bit pregnant. Finally, there is the tantalizing problem of
Justice Frankfurter's emulation of and admiration for Justice Holmes.
The question simply is whether Holmes can properly be his hero and
model. The difficulties here, I take it, are more with Holmes than with
Frankfurter. Holmes as a judge was not introspectively concerned with
the power hw was exercising. His flair for epigrammatic brevity not only
made him a judicial stylist quite different from Justice Frankfurter but
it lead, as for example in Eisner v. Macomber' or Buck v. Bell,"0 to
simplistic short cuts Justice Frankfurter would have found abhorrent.
S. See especially the challange in Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 3.
9. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
10. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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And however "clear and present danger" may have begun in the Holmes
opinions, it seems to me unlikely that Holmes, by the time of the great
dissents, would have found Justice Frankfurter's current reading of it
congenial.
It is instructive after reading Professor Mendelson's book to go
back and read the second flag salute case again. Who now seems to have
the better of the debate there? Certainly Justice Frankfurter's explicit
statement of his approach is impressive. It could not be clearer that he is
deciding the case against the dictates of his own heart in deference to
other values; he is effective in his insistence that the result be squared
with precedent and that it is not easy for the majority to do so; he is
persuasive in his exposition of the Church-State doctrine and in his con-
tention that there is no violation of that doctrine here; he is thoughtful
in his consideration of future cases this decision will embarrass; he is
effective in his reminder that the Court did not find the state action
unconstitutional in the earlier cases of flag salutes; he is eloquent in his
statement of the rationale for judicial self-restraint. Yet I feel that in the
end he has come down on the wrong side and that his preoccupation with
defining the judicial role has caused him to pay insufficient attention to
the precise issue that was before him. Nowhere in his elaborate 9,000
word essay do we find him confronting the oddity of the case-compelling
children to assert something they did not believe; nowhere are we told
why it is reasonable for the state to require a hypocritical compliance by
the children. The point cannot be adequately pursued here but if we
were to test his approach by comparing his opinion to the dissent of
Justice Stone in the first flag salute case," it seems to me that Stone has
all the better of it, and that at times the Frankfurterian drive toward total
purity in the judicial role will prove too inhibiting on the judge. We
would like our judicial self-restraint to be exercised with some flexibility.
But perhaps it is we who want the impossible and perhaps the Frank-
furter moral is that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot, that is,
decry the intervention of the anti-New Deal judges in the 1930's and
applaud the inervention in the flag salute case. If so, Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Barnette looms as historic evidence of what the price
for judicial impartiality and neutrality really is.
Professor Mendelson has packed a remarkable amount into his small
book and, by reflecting so much of the genius of Justice Frankfurter,
has done a singularly thought-provoking job. It should not, therefore,
be taken as a criticism but as a measure of his success if I conclude by
11. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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observing that what we now need is the big, full length portrait of Justice
Frankfurter as a judge.1" Such a portrait would make a major contribu-
tion to our jurisprudence.
HARRY KALVEN, JR.t
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN. By Jack Walter Peltason. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 270. $4.95.
No process of social change has ever proceeded with more prescience
and self-conscious accumulation of data and observation than American
desegregation. The initial decision, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka,' in 1954 was self-diagnosed as opening up a generation of liti-
gation. Since then the careful coverage of events by floods of New York
Times reporter teams, the myriad of articles, the many books and the
highly laudable yet typically American packrat archivism of the Southern
School News and the Race Relations Law Reporter, have all focused
minutely on this intricate and embroiled social context.
From the beginning a dichotomy developed between a small group
of observers who viewed the process as a potential for value-free research,
urging avoidance of commitment on the substantive issue; as opposed to
a larger group who openly or inferentially believed in some particular
outcome and subordinated social research to that end. It goes almost
without saying that the value commitments of American social science
and intellectual life generally are such that approval of desegregation is
virtually demanded of individual professionals; to be a segregationist
in any of the relevant subject matters of law and social science is to be
a Neanderthal.
Perhaps for that reason the argument over value-commitment has
proven of no deep significance, and few works have really acute positions
on this question. Even taking a stand would not preclude many forms
of objectivity, so that a still further point must be made-that most
work in this area radiates a form of single-minded commitment that
precludes depth of view. Weber's speculation that fresh religious in-
sight tends to develop among peoples on the fringes of a great empire
and Veblen's analysis of the role of marginal social groups in initiating
12. An important start in this direction is the book by Helen Shirley Thomas,
FELIX FRANKFURTER, SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (1960).
' Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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